

# **Associated, Not Absorbed**

*The Associated European Area: a constructive  
alternative to a single European state*

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*By*

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## **The Issue**

France and Germany are seeking changes to the Treaty on European Union to create an 'inner core' of states on a 'fast track' to integration. Countries outside of this bloc should seek treaty changes of their own to allow for an alternate group: the Associated European Area (AEA). These treaty changes would create a European Union composed not merely of two different tracks, but of two different spheres. The countries of Europe would then have a clear choice between these spheres: European government, *via* the inner core, or European trade and association, *via* the Associated European Area. Association members would not be party to any governmental aspects of the European Union, focussing instead upon trade and environmental policy narrowly defined and managed exclusively through intergovernmental channels. The United Kingdom should play a leading rôle in establishing the Association: inviting potentially interested countries to discuss the matter at a conference running in parallel with a European Union Intergovernmental Conference. The United Kingdom must make clear that, true to the views of its population, its only alternative to the Association is outright withdrawal.

## Introduction

The British people's views on Europe are captured by Winston Churchill's assertion that we should be associated but not absorbed by the continent; that we should be "in, but not of Europe".<sup>1</sup> The overwhelming weight of evidence from public attitude surveys underlines this view.<sup>2</sup>

### Figure One

*Eurobarometer survey, United Kingdom, Spring 2000: percentage of respondents answering [x]. Change from Autumn 1999 in parentheses.<sup>3</sup>*

EU Membership a good thing <sup>4</sup>	Benefit from EU membership <sup>5</sup>	Trust in European Commission <sup>7</sup>	Support the euro <sup>6</sup>
<b>25</b> (-4)	<b>25</b> (-4)	<b>24</b> (=)	<b>22</b> (-3)
Support EU foreign policy <sup>8</sup>	Support EU defence policy <sup>9</sup>	EU Enlargement a priority <sup>10</sup>	Support EU Constitution <sup>11</sup> [New question]
<b>40</b> (-1)	<b>49</b> (-7)	<b>26</b> (-3)	<b>47</b>

<sup>1</sup> For this quote and others visit "<http://www.winstonchurchill.org/speeches.htm>".

<sup>2</sup> For a synopsis of opinion poll data on Europe since January 1999 see John Tate, 'The euro: what was the question?', *European Journal* (Oxford: July, 2000). See also Appendix, 'Opinion poll data'.

<sup>3</sup> Percentages in bold are the lowest amongst all fifteen Member States. For the full Eurobarometer survey of all European Union Member States, see "<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo>" or Appendix, 'Opinion poll data'.

<sup>4</sup> "Generally speaking, do you think that [country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing / bad thing / neither good nor bad?"

<sup>5</sup> "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [country] has on balance benefited or not from membership of the European Union?"

<sup>6</sup> "And for each of [the following European Union institutions], please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?"

<sup>7</sup> "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. There has to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the [national currency] and all other national currencies of the member states of the European Union."

<sup>8</sup> "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. The member states of the European Union should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the European Union."

<sup>9</sup> "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. The European Union member states should have a common defence and security policy."

<sup>10</sup> "I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, in your opinion, it should be a priority or not? Welcoming new member countries."

<sup>11</sup> "Do you think that the European Union should or should not have a constitution, that is a core document which brings together the various current Treaties?"

The French and German governments, amongst others, wish to promote precisely the form of Europe, European government, to which the majority of Britons object.<sup>12</sup> To accommodate states that are less enthusiastic and/or less well prepared for further integration than themselves, France and Germany are calling for the ‘flexibility’ doctrine to be enshrined in European law. As understood in Paris and Berlin, flexibility would provide for a ‘two-speed Europe’. The objective, European government, would remain the same, but flexibility would provide for two means of getting there: fast or slow. As President Jacques Chirac put it: “a certain number of countries will have to get together to show the others the way”.<sup>13</sup>

To accommodate flexibility, so defined, France and Germany are calling for treaty changes to facilitate the creation of an ‘inner core’ of states -- something that, under Article 43 of the Amsterdam Treaty, is not now possible.<sup>14</sup> The appropriate response of the United Kingdom is to demand treaty changes of her own.<sup>15</sup> Just as France and Germany are seeking a “pioneering” inner core,<sup>16</sup> the United Kingdom should seek treaty changes allowing for the creation of an alternate grouping: the Associated European Area. The Association would challenge the European Union to become flexible enough to accommodate not merely two tracks, but two different spheres. The countries of Europe would then have a clear choice between these spheres: European government, *via* the inner core, or European trade and association, *via* the Associated European Area.

The name ‘Associated European Area’ reflects the intergovernmental nature of the group, the words ‘associated’ and ‘area’ connoting a far looser arrangement than

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<sup>12</sup> I concentrate in this analysis on the views of the French and German governments given that, in the words of President Jacques Chirac, “they alone can make the gestures that will carry Europe further, in its ambitions, in its frontiers and in the hearts of its peoples... Long live Germany! Long live France! And long live the European Union”. (Berlin, 27 June 2000).

<sup>13</sup> President Jacques Chirac, speech to the Reichstag (Berlin, July 2000).

<sup>14</sup> Article 43 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) contains protocols allowing certain Member States to pursue projects without other Member States, subject to a long list of conditions consisting in essence in the overall condition that projects so pursued must not be to the detriment of the European Union as a whole and/or to other Member States in particular.

<sup>15</sup> “Appropriate” given the views of the United Kingdom population on the European Union.

<sup>16</sup> “Pioneering” as phrased by President Jacques Chirac, *ibid.*

‘union’ or ‘federation’. Rather than a concentric arrangement, such as the flexibility doctrine of an inner and outer core, the Association would be non-centric in structure, based upon a narrow set of rules created and applied equally through strictly intergovernmental channels.<sup>17</sup> By forming the Association, participant states would avoid the alternative fate of constituting merely the leftovers from the creation of a Franco-German inner core. The Association would thus falsify the view of the countries outside of the Franco-German bloc as laggard, as President Chirac implies,<sup>18</sup> and give them instead a distinct status and direction of their own.

### **Establishing the AEA: the mechanics**

#### *Treaty changes*

The limits on flexibility laid down in Article 43 are too stringent to allow anything like the Associated European Area or the inner core demanded by France and Germany.<sup>19</sup> Only with unanimity among the Member States can the terms of Article 43 be relaxed, which is why drafts of the Treaty of Nice presented by France and Germany weaken the unanimity requirement to qualified majority voting.

At a minimum, the treaty amendments required to accommodate the Association include the following two. The third amendment proposed is not necessary, but desirable.

- i) **An amendment, retrospective in force, allowing the states of the Associated European Area to be subject only to those elements of the *acquis communautaire* compatible with the Association’s focus**

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<sup>17</sup> “Strictly intergovernmental channels” so as to allow direct scrutiny of the Association by the legislatures and electorates of its member countries.

<sup>18</sup> President Jacques Chirac: “A certain number of countries will have to get together to show the others the way.” (Berlin: speech, 27 June 2000).

<sup>19</sup> Only with unanimity among the Member States can the terms of Article 43 be relaxed, which is why drafts of the Nice Treaty presented by France and Germany both weaken this requirement from unanimity (each Member State having a veto) to qualified majority voting.

**upon trade and environmental policy managed through intergovernmental channels.**<sup>20</sup>

Obtaining consensus among European Union Member States for this amendment would be eased by the fact that France and Germany require a similar amendment to establish an inner core. To embark regularly upon European Union projects without other Member States, the Franco-German bloc would have to scrap the requirement that every Union Member accept the *acquis* in full. Differences arise, however, in that the amendment required to establish the inner core need not apply retrospectively, whereas the amendment required to establish the Associated European Area necessarily would have to. Pressure from France and Germany not to give retrospective reach to such an amendment must be resisted, therefore. The ground for resistance would be the fact that treaty changes allowing the countries of the inner core to proceed in their preferred direction -- toward European government -- are no more legitimate than treaty changes allowing the countries of the Associated European Area to proceed in the other direction.

Whilst certain states are already exempt from sections of the *acquis*,<sup>21</sup> these exceptions currently take the form of opt-outs. Providing for limited withdrawals from a limited set of projects, the opt-out mechanism is consonant with the 'single sphere' view of the European Union. Opt-outs enable states at best to qualify rather than challenge that single sphere, and the history of opt-outs is that they are soon relinquished. Further, opt-outs do not extend to the applicant states. As a condition of their accession, applicant states must incorporate all of

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<sup>20</sup> The *acquis communautaire* is the accumulated body of law governing the European Union.

<sup>21</sup> One such exemption constitutes the United Kingdom's opt-out from the Schengen Accord on open borders, incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The opt-out was negotiated to apply to the whole of the Accord, but has been relinquished by the current Government on all but the common border element of the agreement.

the *acquis* in full; an *acquis* that has at times been growing faster than they have been able to incorporate it into domestic law.

By removing the United Kingdom from all areas of qualified majority voting, the proposed amendment would also have the effect of upholding the provision in the 1972 Act providing for the supremacy of Parliament. Having been discharged egregiously at European Union level, responsibilities including aid, agriculture, and fisheries policy would be repatriated.

**ii) An amendment providing for the right of states in the Associated European Area freely to conclude trade agreements in the absence of action by the European Union as a whole.**

The repeated attempts of the European Commission to secure a free-trade arrangement with the Nafta group were blocked by a single Member State: France.<sup>22</sup> This amendment would allow the Association, whilst remaining within the Single Market, to secure its own free-trade arrangements in the absence of action by the European Union as a whole.

This amendment would of course require renegotiation of the customs union element of the European Union. Were the Association to abolish trade restrictions with Nafta members, for example, then a core element of the customs union would be compromised: the free circulation of goods and services within its borders. Nafta countries would enjoy privileged access to some parts of the European Union economy (the countries of the Association that are within the Union) but not to other parts.

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<sup>22</sup> The signatories to the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) are Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The repeated attempts of European Union Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan to conclude a free trade agreement with the Nafta group collapsed due to French concerns regarding the possibility of dumping by the United States.

Accommodating this situation would not require scrapping the customs union, however, for it could instead be qualified in much the same way as the United Kingdom qualifies the free movement of people by retaining independent border controls. For the United Kingdom, moreover, there is a special reason to renegotiate the customs union. Presently, 90% of the customs duty collected by Member States must be paid to the European Community Budget -- 10% being held back to cover collection costs. Minus the United Kingdom, European Union Member States do on average approximately 13% of their trade with non-European Union states, meaning that only a substantial minority of their imports are subject to duty.<sup>23</sup> The United Kingdom does just over 50% of her trade with non-European Union states,<sup>24</sup> meaning that she collects more duty than many other Member States combined. The import duty generated by the United Kingdom is a chief cause of her overall contribution to the Community Budget being so high compared with her per capita wealth.<sup>25</sup>

**iii) An amendment stating that nothing in the *acquis* shall be interpreted as challenging the right of Member States, under their own authority, to withdraw from the European Union.**

Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty of Rome contains no right of exit. If European Union Member States are still sovereign, however, it follows that the right of secession must still lie with them. (Not even the European Commission has yet claimed the European Union to be a

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<sup>23</sup> This “substantial minority” is less than the (approximate) 13% figure, for the 13% figure describes the total amount of trade done by European Union countries (excluding the United Kingdom) with non-European Union countries, and thus includes many forms of trade not subject to duty.

<sup>24</sup> Office for National Statistics data for 1999 show trade with European Union countries to constitute 49.6% of the United Kingdom’s total foreign trade (London, 2000).

<sup>25</sup> Member States’ contributions to the Community Budget are based in part, *via* Fourth Resource Payments, on their comparative Gross Domestic Product per capita.

sovereign body.<sup>26</sup>) This amendment would make explicit the right of secession for those states that wish to preserve it,<sup>27</sup> whilst allowing those states that wish to relinquish the right the opportunity to do so explicitly rather than, as at present, by legal attrition. Doubtless the issue of secession will one day, if only in a limited fashion, require clarification. It is wise to provide this clarification now rather than to wait until the issue arises in a more urgent and divisive fashion.

These three treaty changes would of course be centripetal in their effect, in contrast to the centrifugal way in which the European Union has evolved hitherto. The centripetal effect of these changes makes them no less legitimate, however.

### *Negotiations*

Potential members of the Association should be invited to send representatives to discuss the matter at a conference initiated by the United Kingdom and conducted alongside a European Union Intergovernmental Conference. States invited to send representatives would include many of those who are unhappy with the Franco-German proposal for a 'fast' and 'slow' lane to be established in order to streamline the process of European integration (concentric flexibility), as well as states outside of the European Union altogether. Some of the states opposed to concentric flexibility are, of course, opposed only because they fear that they would not qualify for 'fast lane' integration. States in this category, such as Italy, would not therefore be invited to discuss the Association. Invited states would instead comprise those that object to concentric flexibility, not on the ground that they would be excluded from the fast lane, but on the ground that they do not welcome the destination to which either the fast or slow lane lead.

States invited to join the Association would include Denmark,<sup>28</sup> Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Amongst the wealthiest nations in the world,<sup>29</sup> and

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<sup>26</sup> In speeches in June and July 2000, the German Foreign Minister, Joscha Fischer, lamented the fact that the Union is not yet sovereign. See, for example, *Libération*, 7 July, 2000.

<sup>27</sup> Including at a minimum the states of the Associated European Area.

<sup>28</sup> Denmark's invitation would be subject to a 'No' vote in her referendum on Economic and Monetary Union (28 September, 2000).

amongst the oldest and most admired democracies, the admission of these states, allied with the United Kingdom, would underwrite powerfully the credibility of the Association. All of the applicant states would also be invited to join the Association -- many such states having voiced discontent at the current direction of the European Union. Reinforcing the applicant states' desire for reform is the fact that they will almost certainly be excluded from the Union's most lucrative (and wasteful) projects, such as the Common Agricultural Policy.<sup>30</sup> The Association would also relieve applicant states of the burden of having to incorporate the *acquis* in full. These states would be left instead with their newly self-governing arrangements intact as well as with new, lightly regulated channels through which to secure access to global markets and inward investment.

[INSERT FIGURE TWO]


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<sup>29</sup> Per capita.

<sup>30</sup> Poland, for example, is seeking urgently to gain access to the Common Agricultural Policy, though the European Commission has made clear that she will not be admitted.

**Figure three**

*The Creation of the Associated European Area*<sup>31</sup>



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<sup>31</sup> Dates quoted are based upon the European Union Intergovernmental Conference for 2000, though they could be adapted to apply to any future Conference.

*AEA: alternative to withdrawal*

A core objection to the Associated European Area might be that it constitutes, or will necessarily be construed by the press and public to constitute, withdrawal from the European Union. The appropriate response to this concern is threefold. First, the existence of the Association would allow the issue of Europe henceforth to transcend the binary in/out question. A second response is that renegotiation is not new: throughout its history the European Union has been renegotiated in a direction that suits those in favour of further integration. Renegotiation continues apace with the demand of France and Germany for treaty changes to accommodate an inner core. The creation of the Association would simply constitute renegotiation in the other direction.

A third point is that it is not in the interests of the European Union to eject the United Kingdom, not least because of the large trading deficit that the United Kingdom runs with its fellow Member States.

**Figure four**

*Balance of trade with European Union countries, 1999 (industrial goods, millions).*

UK exports to EU	£96,913
UK imports from EU	£103,115
Trade deficit	£6,202

In 1998, the average of the tariffs that the European Union placed upon imported industrial goods was 3.6%. Barring retaliatory measures, an average 3.6% tariff would have yielded £3,441 million had it been imposed upon United Kingdom goods exported to the European Union in 1998 -- £1,748 million less than the United Kingdom actually contributed to the Community Budget in that year.

### Figure five

*Exports and net contributions to the European Union by the United Kingdom, and potential tariff yields, 1995-1999 (millions).*

Year	UK goods exports <sup>32</sup>	Contribution (net) of UK to EU <sup>33</sup>	Potential tariff yield at 3.6% <sup>34</sup>	Contribution minus potential tariff yield
1995	£89,684	£4,774	£3,229	£1,545
1996	£95,965	£3,122	£3,455	£333
1997	£95,908	£2,733	£3,453	-£720
1998	£95,726	£5,189	£3,441	£1,748
(1999	£96,913	£2,486 <sup>35</sup>	£3,449	-£963)

Other European Union countries are unlikely, then, to block the creation of the Associated European Area if they believed that any such action would drive the United Kingdom toward withdrawal. The United Kingdom must therefore make clear that her only alternative to the Association is indeed withdrawal.

### *Ratification*

The treaty establishing the Associated European Area would be the subject of referendums in all of the signatory countries so as to enshrine the legitimacy of the project. One might object that the Association would, like the European Union, evolve in ways that would eventually take it beyond the mandate conferred by such referendums. The appropriate response to this concern is twofold.

<sup>32</sup> Data for industrial goods exports only. Released by the Office for National Statistics (London: March 2000).

<sup>33</sup> Balance on current transfers relating to European Union institutions, from the Office for National Statistics' *Pink Book*, p.70. Data excludes payments to the European Development Fund (EDF) to Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (EDF funding for financial years 1996-7 to 2001-2 is as follows: 1996-97, £151m; 1997-98, £137m; 1998-99, £213m; 1999-2000, £214m; 2000-01, £97m; and 2001-02, £219m). On the United Kingdom's contributions to the Community Budget, see John Tate, 'Research Unit Briefing', the *European Journal* (Oxford, March 2000), p.8.

<sup>34</sup> Figure shown is 3.6% of total industrial goods exported to the countries of the European Union by value.

<sup>35</sup> Office for National Statistics data for the United Kingdom's contribution to the Community Budget in 1999 was unavailable at the time of writing. Contribution figure cited is that forecast in the White Paper *European Community Finance* published in June 1999, which employs a more conservative measure of the United Kingdom's contributions.

First, the analogy between the evolution of the European Union and the likely evolution of the Association is misguided. The analogy is misguided because the ambit of the Association would by treaty be narrow and for the most part static, in contrast to the expansive and evolutionary dynamic built into the Treaty on European Union with phrases such as “ever-closer union”. Concerned principally with trade matters and intergovernmental cooperation, meetings of the Association would bear little resemblance to a European Union Intergovernmental Conference.

The second response to the important question of legitimacy is for the treaty establishing the Association to contain a clause requiring that any amendments to it be passed unanimously at summits held at fixed intervals. Fixing the time of summits (every four years, for example) would preclude their being held to coincide with given peaks or troughs in public opinion. The clause would further state that amendments passed in summit meetings should be subject to referendums in all of the member states. Being narrow in focus, it is unlikely that summit meetings would regularly recommend amendments. Summit meetings would be more likely, like those of Nato and Nafta countries, to generate decisions and initiatives consonant with the founding agreement.

#### *European Union institutions*

Having withdrawn from significant sections of the *acquis*, the states of the Associated European Area would also withdraw from the supranational institutions of the European Union such as the Commission and the Parliament. The countries of the Association would then secure observer status on these bodies, and would retain voting rights on the core sections of the *acquis* to which they still subscribed. Association members would surrender their voting rights and vetoes upon all European Union business beyond the realm of environmental and trade policy narrowly defined. The withdrawal of Association members from the Commission and the Parliament would be a radical extension of the present trend

in the Union toward greater intergovernmental co-operation.<sup>36</sup> Association states would retain representation on the Council of Ministers, given the intergovernmental working of that body, but would have only observer status during discussions on the *acquis* to which they do not subscribe.

One might object that allowing states to subscribe to two different versions of the *acquis* would create an unwieldy arrangement prone to collapse. The most salient counter-objection to this criticism is that France and Germany must themselves create two versions of the *acquis*, ‘full’ and ‘partial’, if they are to establish the inner core. Further, to accept this objection would be to dismiss the many examples of complex legal-institutional arrangements that function successfully: from the Scottish and English legal systems cohabiting within the United Kingdom, to eurozone and non-eurozone countries within the European Union. It is not beyond the realms of political science to devise institutional arrangements to accommodate both the inner core and the Associated European Area. Certainly, to reject the entire project because of potential legal-institutional complications is perverse. As Kings Charles and John were forced to learn,<sup>37</sup> the task of those who engineer our governing institutions is to fashion them to accommodate the views of the governed -- not the other way around.


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<sup>36</sup> The trend toward greater intergovernmental co-operation in the European Union is lamented by Commissioner Patten in his report of June, 2000. The Commissioner cites Economic and Monetary Union as almost totally dominated by the Council of Ministers, leaving the Commission impotent.

<sup>37</sup> King John was forced in 1215 to sign the Magna Carta, granting legal rights and protections such as jury trial to the Norman aristocracy. King Charles I was executed by Parliament, led by Oliver Cromwell, for “tyranny”.

**Figure six**

*Selected inner core, AEA-inner core, and AEA projects:*



### **Implications for Conservative Party policy<sup>41</sup>**

#### **A Policy of Renegotiation**

Short of a specific proposal such as the Associated European Area, the Conservative Party's policy of not being "run by Europe" is, and will continue to be understood by the press and public to be sophistry. The shift towards European Government has gone so far that failure to renegotiate undermines the very principles that the Party exists to promote: namely, the national interest and the self-governance of the British people. It must be put to the Government in the run-up to the Intergovernmental Conference that they should veto the Treaty of Nice unless amendments are proposed to allow the creation of the Association. The Party would then have a robust and coherent policy platform on which it could oppose the Government's negotiating stance in Europe, both at Nice and beyond. The alternative to adopting such a policy is to have the Party's attacks neutralised as commentators ask how a Conservative administration would itself proceed --

<sup>38</sup> The Common Foreign and Security Policy.

<sup>39</sup> The Common Fisheries Policy.

<sup>40</sup> The Common Agricultural Policy.

<sup>41</sup> As the party most closely approximating public opinion on Europe, I will confine my analysis of the Associated European Area in this section to why it ought to be adopted by the Conservative Party.

the Party having to respond piecemeal, issue-by-issue, rather than with an overarching policy.

The policy of opposing only future transfers of sovereignty, reiterated in the draft manifesto 'Believing in Britain', has been compromised by the Party's promises to revisit and revise the Common Agricultural Policy; the Common Fisheries Policy; and European policy on weights and measures. To revisit these and not other failing policies is, and is understood by the press and public to be a selective, *ad hoc* response to a much wider problem. Challenging or ignoring individual rulings of the European Court is equally myopic, for it is the treaties themselves that must be challenged and renegotiated, and not their myriad consequences.

A second policy included in the draft manifesto is to "support the principle of 'reinforced co-operation' [flexibility] under which small groups of countries can integrate more closely together if they wish to do so, although we will use our veto to stop them in cases where their action would damage our national interest." Whilst the essence of this promise may be appealing, it is in fact confused. The very essence of the 'reinforced co-operation', as advanced by France and Germany, is that the veto on closer co-operation be replaced with qualified majority voting.

A third manifesto promise, "to reject an autonomous EU defence identity", implies that the Party will in government renegotiate the autonomous defence identity that, at St. Malo, Cologne, and Feira, has already been created. Indeed, the Feira summit report made specific mention of an "autonomous" defence identity with a "single institutional structure". Despite this fact, the Party leadership still deny that they will engage in renegotiation. If European defence is extended at Nice, this refusal to renegotiate will be thrown into even sharper relief.

Establishing the Associated European Area would require political will and effective diplomacy, but no more than the United Kingdom has deployed on many occasions in the past. The United Kingdom has often taken a lead in Europe, not least when her

politicians and diplomats established the European Free Trade Area. Establishing the Association would be an act of statesmanship worthy of both the Conservative Party and the nation. In the words of William Pitt:

England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, I trust, save Europe by her example.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> William Pitt, speech, London Guildhall (London: 1805).

## Appendix

### Poll data on the euro, 14 January 1999 to 16 May 2000.

1999	Company	Client	Age group	'euro' %	'pound' %	Don't know %
14--20 Jan	MFS <sup>43</sup>	SSB <sup>44</sup>	16+	33	51	16
5--7 Feb	ICM	GDN <sup>45</sup>	18+	36	52	12
25 Feb--3 Mar	MFS	SSB	16+	32	52	15
5--7 Mar	ICM	GDN	18+	31	53	16
19--22 Mar	MORI <sup>46</sup>	TIMES	18+	31	56	13
16--17 Apr	ICM	GDN	18+	34	53	13
2 Apr--4 May	MFS	SSB	16+	31	53	15
7--8 May	ICM	GDN	18+	35	52	13
26 May--3 Jun	GALLUP	D TEL <sup>47</sup>	18+	29	66	5
4--5 Jun	ICM	GDN	18+	27	61	13
10--11 Jun	MORI	S TEL <sup>48</sup>	18+	24	57	18
8--13 Jun	MFS	SSB	16+	27	58	15
9--11 Jul	ICM	GDN	18+	25	62	13
13--15 Aug	ICM	GDN	18+	24	60	16
2--7 Sep	MFS	SSB	16+	30	56	14
10--13 Sep	MORI	GMB	15+	31	53	16
22--26 Oct	ICM	GDN	18+	27	58	14
12--14 Nov	ICM	GDN	18+	28	59	13
11--18 Nov	MFS	SSB	16+	27	56	17
10--12 Dec	ICM	GDN	18+	24	61	15
2000						
14--17 Jan	ICM	GDN	18+	25	63	11
13--18 Jan	MFS	SSB	16+	29	56	14
11--18 Feb	ICM	GDN	18+	24	63	12
24 Feb--2 Mar	MFS	SSB	16+	26	58	15
1--7 Mar	GALLUP	D TEL	18+	27	69	3
11--16 May	MFS	SSSB <sup>49</sup>	18+	25	60	14

<sup>43</sup> "MFS": Market and Opinion Research International, Financial Services.

<sup>44</sup> "SSB": Salomon Smith Barney.

<sup>45</sup> "GDN": *The Guardian*.

<sup>46</sup> "MORI": Market and Opinion Research International.

<sup>47</sup> "D TEL": *Daily Telegraph*.

<sup>48</sup> "S TEL": *Sunday Telegraph*.

<sup>49</sup> "SSSB": Shroder Salomon Smith Barney.

**Eurobarometer survey, Spring 2000<sup>50</sup>**  
(Change from Autumn 1999 in parentheses.)

	Membership good thing <sup>51</sup>		Benefit from membership <sup>52</sup>		Trust in European Commission <sup>58</sup>		Support the euro <sup>53</sup>		Support foreign policy <sup>54</sup>		Support common defence policy <sup>55</sup>		Enlargement a priority <sup>56</sup>		Support EU Constitution <sup>57</sup> [New question]
B	62	(+8)	60	(+10)	57	(+4)	76	(-1)	72	(=)	85	(+1)	28	(+2)	75
DK	53	(-1)	65	(+1)	42	(+3)	40	(-2)	53	(-6)	53	(-2)	57	(-1)	59
D	41	(-6)	37	(=)	34	(+1)	50	(-5)	69	(-2)	76	(=)	<b>20</b>	(+1)	68
GR	61	(+2)	75	(+5)	50	(+1)	69	(-1)	73	(-2)	76	(-3)	53	(-1)	82
E	67	(+3)	66	(+5)	56	(+2)	75	(+3)	66	(+3)	76	(+4)	31	(+4)	74
F	49	(+1)	49	(+3)	54	(+4)	67	(+3)	70	(+4)	82	(+4)	21	(+2)	75
IRL	75	(-7)	86	(-2)	61	(+1)	63	(-15)	61	(=)	56	(-1)	42	(-7)	53
I	60	(=)	51	(+1)	58	(-5)	81	(-4)	77	(+2)	85	(+2)	30	(-5)	84
L	75	(-6)	69	(-3)	57	(+5)	76	(-3)	68	(-3)	79	(-1)	25	(-1)	71
NL	73	(+2)	65	(=)	53	(+5)	67	(-8)	74	(-3)	83	(-2)	32	(-3)	88
A	33	(-9)	34	(-11)	40	(-6)	48	(-10)	63	(-3)	61	(-4)	23	(-1)	65
P	64	(-4)	71	(-6)	57	(-5)	64	(-1)	58	(+1)	66	(-2)	25	(-4)	63
FIN	40	(-4)	42	(+2)	48	(+1)	49	(+2)	53	(+3)	46	(=)	21	(-2)	66
S	34	(-3)	26	(-3)	34	(-4)	38	(-5)	50	(-3)	<b>45</b>	(-7)	48	(=)	72
UK	<b>25</b>	(-4)	<b>25</b>	(-4)	<b>24</b>	(=)	<b>22</b>	(-3)	<b>40</b>	(-1)	49	(-7)	26	(-3)	<b>47</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>(-2)</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>(+1)</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>(=)</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>(-2)</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>(=)</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>(=)</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>(-1)</b>	<b>70</b>

<sup>50</sup> See "http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo". Figures in bold represent the lowest in a given category, excepting figures for the European Union as a whole.

<sup>51</sup> "Generally speaking, do you think that [country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing / bad thing / neither good nor bad?"

<sup>52</sup> "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [country] has on balance benefited or not from membership of the European Union?"

<sup>53</sup> "And for each of [the following European Union institutions], please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?"

<sup>54</sup> "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. There has to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the [national currency] and all other national currencies of the member states of the European Union."

<sup>55</sup> "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. The member states of the European Union should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the European Union."


<sup>56</sup> "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. The European Union member states should have a common defence and security policy."

<sup>57</sup> "I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority or not? Welcoming new member countries."

<sup>58</sup> "Do you think that the European Union should or should not have a constitution, that is a core document which brings together the various current Treaties?"

**Figure two**

*Potential inner core &  
AEA members:*



\* = EU applicant states.