[ARTICLE 15b]

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY:

UK LEFT REDUNDANT IN BLOCKING=

COUNCIL DECISIONS AND EU FOREIGN MINISTER POWERS

[ARTICLE 15b]

AMENDMENT TO: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and t= he Treaty establishing the European Community (Lisbon, 13 December 2007)<= /span>

Policy Area:

Treaty= on European Union, Title V, provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy, Chapter 2, Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy, section 1 Common provisions, Article 15b

Amendment:

Clause 2, page 1<= /span>, line 12, leave out ‘any’ and insert—<= /o:p>

‘(i) Article 1, paragr= aph 34, inserted Article 15b TEU relating to decisions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy; and

(ii) any other’

Amendment:

Clause 2<= /span>, page 1, line 12, leave out ‘any’ and insert—

‘(i) Article 1, paragr= aph 25, headings relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy; and=

(ii) any other’.=

Lisb= on Treaty Article:

“34) An Article 15b shall be inserted, with= the text of Article 23, with the following amendments:

(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: "Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting = unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative a= cts shall be excluded." and the last sentence in the second subparagraph shall b= e replaced by the following: "If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.";

(b) paragraph 2 shall = be amended as follows:

(i) the first indent shall be replaced by the following two indents:

"– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of

a decision of the European Coun= cil relating to the Union's strategic intere= sts

and objectives, as referred to in Article 10 B(1),

– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal

which the High Representative of th= e Union for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the

European Council, made on its own initiative or t= hat of the

High Representative,";

(ii) in the second ind= ent, which shall become the third indent, the words "a joint

action or a common position," s= hall be replaced by "a decision defining a Union

action or position,";

(iii) in the second subparagraph, first sentence, the word "important" shall be repla= ced by "vital"; the last sentence shall be replaced by the following: "The High

Representative will, in close consultation with t= he Member State involved, search

for a solution acceptable to it. = If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request = that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.= ";

(iv) the third subpara= graph shall be replaced by the following new paragraph 3, the last subparagraph s= hall become paragraph 4 and paragraph 3 shall be

renumbered 5:

"3. The European Council may unanimously ado= pt a decision stipulating that

the Council shall act by a qualif= ied majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.";<= /o:p>

(c) in the paragraph n= ow numbered 4, the words "This paragraph shall not apply" shall be r= eplaced by "Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply".

Consolidated Treaty Article(s):<= o:p>

= 220;Article 23

1. Decisions under this title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent t= he adoption of such decisions.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention = by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decis= ion commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned sha= ll refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action base= d on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent mo= re than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of t= he Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopt= ed.

2. = By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:

= 212; when adopting joint actions, common positions or takin= g any other decision on the basis of a common strategy,

= 212; when adopting any decision implementing a joint action= or a common position,

= 212; when appointing a special representative in accordance= with Article 18(5).

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be take= n by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Cou= ncil for decision by unanimity.

The= votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoptio= n, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.

This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

3. = For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.&#= 8221;

Explanation:

The new Article 15b (in place of current article = 23 TEU) asserts that the European Council is not the only political actor to t= ake decisions under this chapter. Decisions on CFSP matters will continue to be taken on the basis of unanimity. It stresses the exclusion of “the adoption of legislative acts” and therefore, clarifies that the Europ= ean Council does not have a role in adopting legislation.

It has become difficult for the Council not to adopt a decision, and Member States are left severely disabled in blocking a decision. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced in the present Artic= le 23 a possibility to facilitate decision making in areas where unanimity is required. Hence, a Member State may qualify its abstention from a vote by making a formal declaration – therefore the Member State in question shall not be o= bliged to apply the decision but must accept that the decision commits the Union. Furthermore, it must refrain from any action likely to conflict with the Union action. Under the present Article 23, = 220;If the members of the Council qualifyi= ng their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2 (qualified majority voting) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.” However, under the Lisbon Treaty "If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one thir= d of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Un= ion, the decision shall not be adopted." Therefore, it has become much more difficult for Council not to adopt a decision.

To make matters worse, under the Lisbon Treaty, Member States can oppose the adoption of a decision by QMV for reasons of “vital” instead of the present “important”, reasons= of national policy which will make more difficult to oppose to the adoption of= the decision.

The second paragraph also reconfirms the powers of the High Representative. This Article increases the areas in which Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) would be applied to CFSP matters from those establish= ed in Article 23(2) TEU – this includes decisions on proposals presented= by the High Representative. This is entirely unacceptable. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduces the possibility that the High Representative will be char= ged with the responsibility of searching for a solution.

Finally, Article 15b (3= ) is a p= asserelle clause which allows for the extension of QMV in CFSP matters further than t= hose already mentioned above, following the unanimous agreement within the Europ= ean Council. Although this provision on QMV as well as the = passerelle clause will not be applicable to decisions= “having military or defence implications”, it wil= l have a massive impact on foreign and security policy. The UK will= simply not be able to pursue an independent foreign and security policy, since the bulk of our legislation will have been decided in the Council and through t= he clandestine briefings of a faceless mystery of a High Representative.

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